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Interactive Consistency on a Time-Triggered
Real-Time Control Network
Colin Ryan, Donal Heffernan, and Gabriel Leen
Abstract—Current and emerging safety-critical applications
such as the automotive X-by-wire systems require a high degree
of reliability. These dependable embedded distributed systems
require an ultra-reliable communication system to exchange data
between the distributed components. In addition to guaranteeing
a high level of reliability, these communication systems should
facilitate the development of fault-tolerant applications. This
can be achieved by providing additional communication system
services such as interactive consistency. Interactive consistency
on a communication system can be defined as a means to ensure
that all non-faulty nodes on the communication system receive
a consistent value for any message communicated. This paper
describes the adoption of an explicit interactive consistency al-
gorithm on a time-triggered broadcast communication system,
using a shared communication medium. This is supported by the
development of a prototype implementation of the interactive
consistency algorithm. This prototype system demonstrates that
interactive consistency is successfully achieved in the presence of
a number of faults.
Index Terms—Control network, interactive consistency,
real-time, time-triggered, ultra-reliable.
I. INTRODUCTION
REAL-TIME control networks such as controller area net-work (CAN) [1] are widely used in distributed control ap-
plications such as industrial automation, automotive vehicles,
aviation, and satellite control systems. However, the technical
capabilities of networks such as CAN are being pushed to the
limit by applications that require greater bandwidth, more pre-
dictable real-time guarantees on message transfer, and fault-tol-
erant operation. In addition, such real-time control networks
must support new and emerging safety-critical real-time dis-
tributed control applications. Examples of such applications in-
clude the automotive X-by-wire systems, whereby mechanical
components, such as steering columns, are being replaced by
ultra-reliable distributed electronic systems [2]–[5].
In safety-critical systems, a failure or a malfunction of a con-
trol application can result in the loss of human life. Thus, there
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is a need to design safety-critical systems to meet the most strin-
gent safety requirements. Such systems can also be classified as
ultra-dependable or ultra-reliable systems. Because of the po-
tential catastrophic consequences resulting from the failure of
these systems, they are required to be fail-operational, i.e., they
must continue to operate in the presence of a failure [6]–[11].
The reliability of such systems is often defined in terms of the
failure rate of the system per hour of operation. Such ultra-reli-
able systems are required to have a failure rate of failures
per hour or less [7], [10], [11]. Such systems are also required
to have a maximum system service outage time (i.e., the max-
imum time that a specific system service, such as steering, is
unavailable) of between 10 and 100 ms, depending on the ap-
plication [7], [10]. These figures are generally derived from the
existing safety-critical systems in the aerospace domain. It is
envisaged that even more stringent reliability requirements may
be necessary for automotive safety-critical systems. This is as a
result of the increasing number of automotive vehicles, and thus
the increased number of hours of operation, as opposed to the
aerospace applications, such as fly-by-wire systems in commer-
cial aircraft [10].
Ultra-reliable systems must be able to tolerate the worst-case
faulty behavior of a component, which is defined as a Byzan-
tine fault, affecting any component in the system [7], [8],
[11], [12]. A Byzantine faulty component may behave in an
arbitrary manner, including sending different arbitrary outputs
to different observers. Byzantine faults must be addressed in
the design of ultra-reliable communication systems [7], [8],
[11]–[13]. A single Byzantine fault can cause a failure, even in
a system that incorporates multiple redundant components, by
causing the inputs of the redundant components to diverge. Also
by considering Byzantine faults, random component faults can
be tolerated. Byzantine faults can occur even if all observers, or
receivers, obtain data from a common source such as a single
communication channel. For example, on a broadcast commu-
nication channel, these faults may be caused by slightly out
of specification (SOS) faults relating to signal voltage and/or
signal timing. These faults can result in different observers
deducing different values for any signal. They can also result in
faults propagating through non-faulty components. Please refer
to [11]–[13] for a detailed description of how Byzantine faults
may manifest themselves on a communication system and how
they may propagate through non-faulty components.
One of the essential building blocks of an ultra-reliable dis-
tributed system is a mechanism to communicate control mes-
sage information between the distributed components. To facil-
itate this, an ultra-reliable communication system is required to
have a probability of failure that is less than that required by the
application itself. To meet the reliability requirements of such
1551-3203/$20.00 © 2006 IEEE
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automotive X-by-wire applications, the control message com-
munication system itself may be required to have a failure rate
of failures per hour or less [11].
Time-triggered communication systems have been estab-
lished, through research work over the past decade, as the
most appropriate scheduling strategy for high-reliability and
safety-critical embedded system communications . [14], [15].
Time-triggered, as opposed to event-triggered, communication
systems are based on a message schedule, which defines the
temporal access pattern for the entire communication system
[16]. Time-triggered communication systems are based on
a time division multiple access (TDMA) scheme, whereby
the time position of the time slot dictates when a message is
sent or received, based on a global communication schedule.
In such systems, message exchange is controlled strictly by
the progression of time, using a globally synchronized clock.
Time-triggered systems allow the maximum message latency
to be guaranteed, an important requirement for deterministic
real-time applications. They also facilitate system compos-
ability and fault tolerance [6], [17], [18]. However, to provide
reliable operation, time-triggered communication systems must
provide a highly reliable distributed clock synchronization
service. In addition, they must include some mechanism to
ensure the correct temporal operation of all communication
system nodes.
The current state-of-the-art time-triggered communica-
tion networks for automotive control applications include:
time-triggered controller area network (TTCAN) [19], [20],
time-triggered protocol (TTP/C) [21], [22], and FlexRay [23].
Currently, TTCAN is not suitable for use in safety-critical
applications because it does not provide any redundant com-
munication channels, nor does it specify any mechanisms
to ensure the temporal isolation of faulty nodes. However,
research work has been carried out by the authors to provide
additional, synchronized communication channels in a TTCAN
system [24]. This in an important step toward the development
of a more reliable TTCAN communication system.
In addition to the high reliability requirement, the commu-
nication system must support the development of dependable
systems by providing services such as interactive consistency.
Interactive consistency on a communication system can be
defined as a means to ensure that all non-faulty nodes on
the communication system receive a consistent value for any
message communicated. Interactive consistency provides input
agreement between any redundant components that can obtain
data from the communication system. It can also be used to
ensure that all nodes agree on the current state of the commu-
nication system, including the history of messages received.
Designing in an interactive consistency scheme reduces the
complexity in developing fault-tolerant distributed applica-
tions, which would otherwise have to inherently provide these
services. Other communication system services such as dis-
tributed diagnosis are also useful to support the development of
dependable systems. A distributed diagnosis service would pro-
vide correct and consistent diagnosis information to all nodes
[25], [26]. This research work is concerned with providing an
interactive consistency service; however, it is envisaged that
this will facilitate the development of additional services such
as distributed diagnosis.
Current state-of-the-art automotive control networks, using
a shared communication medium, do not provide an explicit
interactive consistency algorithm. Highly dependable control
networks such as TTP/C and FlexRay provide a Byzantine
fault-tolerant clock synchronization mechanism; however,
they do not provide a Byzantine fault-tolerant mechanism for
the communication of data messages. Examples of Byzantine
faulty behavior were observed through heavy-ion fault injection
in the TTP/C protocol [27]. This fault injection work observed
some specific Byzantine fault cases, whereby a subset of nodes
received a message that appeared non-faulty, while other nodes
received a message that appeared faulty. Thus, consistency
was not achieved between all nodes. Such Byzantine faulty
behavior can be caused by SOS behavior relating to signal
voltage or signal timing. TTP/C does consider these faults by
implementing a clique avoidance mechanism, which removes
any nodes that do not agree with the majority, regarding the
status of previous messages transmitted (i.e., if the messages
appeared faulty or non-faulty). This mechanism, however, may
punish non-faulty nodes [11], [28]. In addition, this clique
avoidance mechanism does not consider Byzantine faulty
behavior that may result in different, apparently non-faulty
messages being received by different subsets of nodes. Al-
though such Byzantine faulty behavior may appear to be highly
unlikely, it is possible, especially if data can be obtained from
more than one communication channel.
Some communication systems include message filtering and
other such mechanisms to achieve a weaker form of interactive
consistency [11], [12]. However, the provision of an explicit in-
teractive consistency algorithm on such communication systems
would help to increase reliability and facilitate the development
of more dependable distributed control applications.
This paper proposes the application of an explicit interactive
consistency algorithm, for the exchange of data messages, in a
time-triggered broadcast communication system, using a shared
communication medium. Examples of such communication sys-
tems as already stated are TTCAN, TTP/C, and FlexRay. These
solutions do not employ interactive consistency services. How-
ever, such an interactive consistency algorithm is provided by
the emerging scalable processor independent design for electro-
magnetic resilience (SPIDER) reliable optical BUS (ROBUS)
communication system from NASA [9]. SPIDER is being devel-
oped as a computational platform for ultra-reliable embedded
control systems on board spacecraft. However, ROBUS does not
specify a shared communication medium such as those being
considered in this research work for state-of-the-art automotive
control networks. The interactive consistency algorithm, which
ROBUS is based on, is adopted and re-engineered to provide the
solution for the automotive time-triggered control network.
The following section discusses interactive consistency and
highlights the difficulty in achieving interactive consistency
in the presence of Byzantine faults. In Section III, the types
of faults considered in this research work are presented. In
Section IV, the application of an explicit interactive consis-
tency service to state-of-the-art time-triggered control networks
is discussed, and a solution is presented. Finally, in Section V,
a demonstration prototype implementation of this algorithm is
presented.
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Fig. 1. Interactive consistency counterexample.
II. INTERACTIVE CONSISTENCY
Interactive consistency can be defined as a means to ensure
that all non-faulty processors receive the same, i.e., consistent,
single-source data [7], [8], [11]. Interactive consistency has his-
torically been applied in systems where a number of redundant
processors must exchange data; however, it can also be applied
to an entire distributed communications system. To achieve in-
teractive consistency, the following conditions must be satisfied
[29], [30].
1) Agreement: All non-faulty receivers must agree on the
value of the transmitter.
2) Validity: If the transmitter is non-faulty, then the value
agreed upon by each non-faulty receiver must correspond
to the transmitter’s own value.
Interactive consistency is difficult to achieve if a node or
processor is allowed to fail in an arbitrary manner. An arbitrary
faulty or Byzantine faulty node may behave in an unconstrained
manner, including sending different information to different
receivers. The following example illustrates the difficulty in
achieving interactive consistency. In the presence of a single
Byzantine faulty node, interactive consistency cannot be
achieved using just three nodes. A proof of this impossibility
result is presented in [31]. First, assume that the initial trans-
mitter, Node 1, is faulty, as detailed in Fig. 1. Node 1 initially
sends “Value X” to Node 2 and “Value Y” to Node 3. In the
next round of communication, Node 2 sends “Value X” to Node
3 and Node 3 sends “Value Y” to Node 2. Each node has two
different values and cannot detect which node is faulty, even
if additional rounds of communication are used. In the case
where Node 1 is non-faulty and Node 3 is faulty, Node 2 may
again receive two different values. Thus, interactive consistency
cannot be achieved in this simple three-node example.
This problem of achieving interactive consistency was first
presented and solved by Pease et al. in 1980 [31]. The algorithm
they proposed, the oral message (OM) algorithm, makes no as-
sumptions about the types of faults at any node and assumes the
worst-case failure mode of a node, i.e., a Byzantine faulty node.
The algorithm assumes a point-to-point link between each node,
and it requires the following oral message assumptions.
1) Every message that is sent is delivered correctly.
2) The receiver of a message knows who sent it.
3) The absence of a message can be detected.
To achieve interactive consistency in the presence of
Byzantine faulty nodes, the total number of nodes, , must be
greater than or equal to , and there must be rounds
of communication. In addition, there must be disjoint
communication paths [29], [31], [32]. This is a well-known
problem. The reader can refer to [29] for a detailed discussion.
III. FAULTS CONSIDERED
The proper consideration of Byzantine faults is very impor-
tant in ultra-reliable systems. However, considering fault modes
other than the worst-case faults is also very important. Other less
severe types of faults may appear more frequently than Byzan-
tine faults, and it is possible that they may be tolerated using
fewer system resources. Thambidurai and Park suggest that by
considering less serious fault modes, in conjunction with the
worst-case fault modes, a greater number of faults can be tol-
erated, and the system reliability can be improved [33]. They
proposed the use of a hybrid fault model consisting of mul-
tiple fault modes. The hybrid fault model is used in the algo-
rithm that the authors have chosen to apply to a time-triggered
broadcast communication system, using a shared communica-
tion medium. This hybrid fault model has been used in various
other algorithms and systems, for example, [30], [34], and [35].
The authors have modified the notation from Thambidurai and
Park’s paper so that it corresponds to the notation used for the in-
teractive consistency algorithm presented in [30] and discussed





1) Benign Faulty: A benign faulty component provides a
consistent, detectably faulty output, or no output, to all ob-
servers. In the context of communication system nodes, the
node sends the same detectably faulty message to all receiving
nodes, or it sends no message to all receiving nodes.
2) Symmetric Faulty: A symmetric faulty component may
provide an arbitrary, faulty output to all observers. However,
it provides a consistent output to all observers. In the context
of a communication system, a symmetric faulty node may send
an arbitrary faulty message to all receivers; however, it sends
the same message to all receivers. It should be noted that the
message appears to be non-faulty.
3) Asymmetric Faulty: An asymmetric fault corresponds to a
Byzantine fault. An asymmetric faulty component may provide
an arbitrary faulty output to all observers, and it may provide
different arbitrary outputs to different observers. In the context
a communication system, an asymmetric faulty node may send
different arbitrary messages to different receivers, even for a
single message transmission.
IV. INTERACTIVE CONSISTENCY ON A BROADCAST
TIME-TRIGGERED COMMUNICATION SYSTEM USING
A SHARED COMMUNICATION MEDIUM
A. Overview
Achieving interactive consistency on a communication
system using a shared communication medium presents a
number of challenges. In order to apply an interactive consis-
tency algorithm, the communication system must guarantee a
number of properties of the messages being communicated. A
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problem arises in that the required properties are not directly
guaranteed using a shared communication medium such as that
of TTCAN. However, this paper proposes that such properties
can be realized by temporally partitioning the communication
system into ultra-reliable, virtual, exclusive-access broadcast
communication channels.
Additionally, the algorithm must be suitable for application
to a communication system. A specific algorithm, the unified
protocol, is chosen by the authors as the most appropriate algo-
rithm to apply to a broadcast communication system. The uni-
fied protocol is the basis for the SPIDER ROBUS communica-
tion system, as previously mentioned. The operation of the uni-
fied protocol had been formally verified and proven to be valid
by Miner et al. [30]. This research work presents the unified pro-
tocol as a viable method for achieving interactive consistency
on a broadcast time-triggered communication system, using a
shared communication medium, assuming a number of realistic
requirements of the shared communication channels.
B. Message Properties
The communication system must guarantee a number of
properties of the messages communicated. These properties
correspond to the oral message assumptions presented in
Section II. These properties are required to support the interac-
tive consistency algorithm; however, they do not constrain the
behavior of faulty nodes [29], [34]. They are most directly real-
ized using independent point-to-point links between the nodes,
as opposed to a shared communication medium. However, it is
possible to realize these properties on a shared communication
channel, as will be discussed in Section IV-C.
1) Every Message That Is Sent Is Delivered Correctly: This
first property requires that each message that is transmitted on
the communication system be delivered to each node as intended
by the source of the message. However, this does not imply that
the message must be non-faulty. The communication system can
realize this property by providing a fault-tolerant, reliable, com-
munication medium and strictly ensuring that only scheduled
nodes have access to the communication medium during each
time window. Thus, it is assumed that only the scheduled node
can influence the state of a communication channel.
2) Each Receiver Knows the Source of Each Message: This
second property requires that each receiver knows the source
of each message. Again, this is more difficult to achieve using a
shared communication channel, because the source of a message
might be any node connected to the communication channel.
However, using time-triggered communication systems, each
node is only allowed access to a communication channel during
specific time windows. Therefore, if these time windows can be
guaranteed for the exclusive access of a single, scheduled node,
then the source of each message can be identified based on the
time that the message is being communicated. Thus, the com-
munication system must again ensure that only the scheduled
node has access to a communication channel during any given
time window.
3) Missing Messages Can Be Detected: This third property
requires that missing messages can be detected. Because a
time-triggered communication system is being considered, this
property is implicitly realized. Once the communication system
guarantees the previous assumptions, it is possible to detect if
a message was received during a specific time window, or if no
message was received in that time window.
C. Communication System Requirements
The communication system must guarantee all of the message
properties, which have been presented in the previous section.
Specifically it must realize the following.
1) It must provide a fault-tolerant, reliable, interconnect, i.e., a
reliable communication medium, or channel, that the com-
munication system nodes can use to exchange messages.
2) It must ensure that the scheduled node has exclusive access
to the shared communication medium, or channel, during
each time window.
The message properties are maintained by providing a strict
temporal firewall to ensure the availability of the communica-
tion system, for the scheduled node, to a high degree of relia-
bility. The message properties are also dependent on the com-
munication system providing a highly reliable communication
channel. This is achieved by the communication system pro-
viding a number of redundant communication channels, which
are viewed as a single logical, ultra-dependable, communication
channel. Moreover, due to the temporal firewall, the provision of
fault-tolerant redundant communication channels, and the dif-
ferent physical interface of each node to the communication
channels, this single logical channel can be viewed as a different
logical channel for each scheduled node. Therefore, the shared
communication medium is temporally partitioned into ultra-re-
liable, virtual, exclusive-access broadcast communication chan-
nels. Thus, each node has a virtual exclusive-access broadcast
communication channel during its scheduled time window. It
should be noted that, for this discussion, to allow comprehensive
fault coverage and to simplify further analysis of the algorithm,
all residual faults affecting the communication of messages can
be considered as faults of the source node. This abstraction is
discussed in more detail in [36].
In order to provide the required temporal firewall, the com-
munication system must guarantee that only the scheduled node
may use the communication channel during its time window.
Thus, the communication system must ensure that a faulty
node cannot influence the communication channel outside of
its scheduled time window. For example, a faulty node must
not be able to prevent the scheduled node from communicating,
and it must not assume the identity of the scheduled node.
It is difficult to constrain the unpredictable behavior of a
faulty node on a broadcast communication system. Essentially,
nodes are required to be fail-silent in the time domain, i.e.,
they do not attempt to transmit outside of their scheduled time
windows. It is worth noting that it is not a requirement to
constrain the faulty behavior of a node during its scheduled
time window. A number of approaches can be investigated to
achieve this behavior. This paper presents two methods that
may be applied to time-triggered communication systems, to
achieve this time slot behavior. These methods are as follows:
1) using independent hardware-based bus guardians to pre-
vent unscheduled communication channel access;
2) novel scheduling technique presented by Leen and Hef-
fernan [37].
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1) Bus Guardian Approach: The bus guardian approach in-
volves placing independent hardware devices, which are inde-
pendently synchronized to the communication channel, at each
channel interface [18]. These devices have knowledge of the
communication schedule and enable the node to access the com-
munication channel only during scheduled time windows. These
devices are independent to the node’s communication channel
interface; therefore, they form separate fault containment re-
gions. Bus guardians such as this have been implemented in
TTP/C and FlexRay, to prevent faulty nodes from accessing
the communication system outside of their scheduled time win-
dows. The TTP/C bus guardians, for example, have been shown
to provide the required fail-silent behavior in the time domain
[38], [39]. Unfortunately, these bus guardians add expense, as
they are required in addition to the communication channel in-
terface at each node.
2) Novel Scheduling Technique: An alternative approach to
ensure strict time slot access is suggested by Leen and Heffernan
[37]. This suggestion uses novel scheduling techniques to en-
sure that there is at least one communication channel available
at any time. It requires that each node transmits on each channel
during different time windows. Simple hardware is then used
to remove a node from the communication system in the event
that it attempts to access more than one communication channel
at any time. In this way, it prevents a single faulty node from
disturbing more than one communication channel at any time.
This method utilizes the fact that multiple communication chan-
nels are required to achieve fault tolerance and uses this fact
to prevent a faulty node from disturbing the entire communica-
tion system at any time. This approach may provide an alterna-
tive option to ensuring fail-silent behavior, or indeed, it may be
used in conjunction with more cost-effective bus guardians, to
achieve a high degree of reliability.
D. Interactive Consistency on a Communication System
For each message exchanged on a broadcast communication
system, there is a single source node that transmits the message.
All other nodes on the communication system can receive that
message. For this discussion, it is required that all other nodes
receive the message, regardless of whether the node’s applica-
tion processor or host processor is interested in the data con-
tained in the message. This is similar to TTCAN, whereby all
nodes check each message frame for errors, and it is similar to
TTP/C, whereby each message is used by the protocol controller
to obtain membership information.
This research intends to achieve consistency between all the
nodes, including the initial source node. Thus, the source node
must conclude the same message as all the receiving nodes, for
any message that it transmits. This is a very useful feature as it
provides implicit acknowledgement of all messages transmitted.
It is also important because the source node can deduce the same
diagnosis information as the receiving nodes, if required. It also
ensures that all nodes using the communication system have a
consistent view of the state of the communication system.
There are a number of requirements that the chosen algo-
rithm must satisfy, in order to be applied to the communication
systems being considered. These requirements are discussed in
Section 1) below. The algorithm chosen, the unified protocol, is
discussed in Section 2) below.
1) Requirements of the Algorithm: As already stated, the in-
teractive consistency algorithm must ensure that all messages
communicated, using this algorithm, are received consistently
by all nodes, including the initial source node of the message. In
addition, the algorithm chosen must be suitable for application
to a communication system. The communication system may be
used for many different systems and applications; thus, the size
of the set of nodes using the communication system cannot be
predetermined. As a result, the algorithm chosen should not be
influenced by the size of the set of nodes that must achieve inter-
active consistency. For example, a number of algorithms require
that all nodes using the communication system must transmit at
least one message using the communication system, for each
instance of the specific interactive consistency algorithm. Be-
cause all nodes must transmit messages, the probability of a
faulty node transmitting a message is increased. Therefore, as
the size of the set of nodes increases, the number of faults that
must be tolerated also increases. Such algorithms may also re-
quire that for each faulty node that must be tolerated, an extra
round of communication is required. Therefore, due to the in-
creased probability of faulty nodes, the high communication
system bandwidth usage and the overall message communica-
tion time, such an algorithm is not suitable for this applica-
tion. Instead, a more appropriate algorithm for a communication
system would require that only a subset of the nodes actively
communicate in order to achieve interactive consistency for a
single message.
2) Algorithm Chosen: The unified protocol was chosen by
the authors as the most appropriate algorithm for application
to a communication system [30]. The unified protocol consists
of a cascade of communication stages and middle value select
(or majority select) functions. The unified protocol can be used
for the communication of exact values as required for interac-
tive consistency; however, it can also be used to achieve con-
sensus between approximately equal values, which might be
required for clock synchronization, and other such distributed
services. The unified protocol utilizes the hybrid fault model as
presented in Section III. It specifies the flags receive error and
source error to denote when a benign faulty value has been re-
ceived and to report to other nodes that a benign faulty message
has been received, respectively.
The unified protocol is a multistage or -stage protocol, with
being the total number of communication stages, as illustrated
in Fig. 2. In stage of the protocol, the set of nodes that transmit
messages, the source nodes, , are referred to as the set .
The set of nodes that receive messages, the destination nodes,
, are referred to as the set . In each stage of the protocol,
the source nodes, , transmit messages or values, , to
the destination nodes, . The destination nodes, , perform a
majority vote, , on the data received, , from each
source, . The result of this majority vote is used for the next
communication stage. The flag is used for the next
stage if a was obtained.
The algorithm does not require that the source and the des-
tination nodes for each stage are mutually exclusive. This fa-
cilitates the requirement to achieve interactive consistency be-
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Fig. 2. k-stage protocol.
tween all nodes, including the initial source node. The unified
protocol operates on the assumption that the source nodes, for at
least one communication stage, are free from asymmetric faults.
This asymmetric fault-free stage generates agreement between
nodes.
The number of nodes that actively transmit messages, for
an implementation of the unified protocol, is independent of
the size of the set of nodes that must achieve consistency. The
number of nodes that must transmit messages, in addition to the
initial source node, is dependent on the number of faults that
must be tolerated for any system, given the probability of failure
for nodes in that system. For this discussion, only two rounds
of communication are considered. Therefore, only the source
nodes for one communication stage may contain asymmetric
(or Byzantine) faulty nodes for each instance of the interactive
consistency algorithm, i.e., for each message transmitted using
the algorithm. Thus, the protocol requires that the source nodes
in each communication stage are mutually exclusive in order
to tolerate a single asymmetric faulty initial source node. If the
system must tolerate additional asymmetric faults, then further
communication stages may be used. For a detailed description
of the unified protocol, refer to [30].
E. Applying the Unified Protocol to a Broadcast
Time-Triggered Communication System, Using Shared
Communication Medium
A two-stage instance of the unified protocol is chosen to apply
to a broadcast time-triggered communication system, using a
shared communication medium. The basic structure of a two-
stage implementation of the unified protocol is presented in
Fig. 3. Each stage requires a set of source nodes and a set of
destination nodes. The set of destination nodes for stage 1 cor-
responds to the set of source nodes for stage 2. Thus, there are
three sets of nodes, , and . The set and the set
, respectively, are the source and destination nodes for stage
1, while the set and the set , respectively, are the source
and destination nodes for stage 2.
Each message, that is to be transmitted on the communication
system, is transmitted using this two-stage algorithm. Thus, for
each message to be communicated, the set contains a single
node that is the initial source node of the message. The algo-
rithm ensures that all nodes in the set , the final destination
Fig. 3. Two-stage implementation of the unified protocol.
nodes, deduce a consistent view of the message sent by the ini-
tial source node. This paper intends to achieve interactive con-
sistency between all nodes in the communication system; there-
fore, all nodes must belong to the set . The initial source
node, the node in the set , also belongs to the set . This is
important to ensure that the initial source node can achieve con-
sistency with the other nodes. It also allows the initial source
node to determine if the message was received as intended by
all other nodes. As a result, any failures can be detected, and the
message reception is implicitly acknowledged.
In stage 1, the initial source node, i.e., the single node in the
set , transmits a message to the nodes in the set . Each
node in the set performs a majority vote on the data received
from all eligible nodes in the set . Since, for this discussion,
there is a single node in the set , the value received from this
initial source node is concluded. In the second communication
stage, all of the nodes in the set transmit the result of the
majority vote to all nodes in the . Each node in the set
performs a majority vote on the values received from eligible
sources in the set . If the maximum fault assumptions for
the protocol are not violated, then all nodes in the set will
agree on the message, i.e., interactive consistency will have been
achieved between all nodes in the set . In order to achieve
interactive consistency in the presence of an asymmetric faulty
initial source node, the algorithm requires that .
This is essential because the algorithm requires that at least one
stage is free from asymmetric faulty eligible source nodes.
Because a broadcast communication system is used, all nodes
may observe each message transmitted on the communication
system. The sets of destination nodes for a particular commu-
nication stage detail the nodes that must store and process the
messages transmitted in that communication stage. Only nodes
belonging to the relevant set should process messages intended
for that set. For example, only nodes in the set should use
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Fig. 4. Unified protocol. (a) Using exclusive broadcast communication chan-
nels. (b) Using a shared broadcast communication channel.
the messages transmitted from the node in the set , i.e., the
initial source node.
It is intended that interactive consistency be achieved without
the addition of functionally redundant nodes, unlike the ROBUS
implementation example [9]. The node in the set is the initial
source node of the message. The nodes in the set are a subset
of the other nodes in the communication system. The specific
nodes in the set are dependent on the current set and
may be different for each set . The set is predefined in the
communication system schedule for each message. In order to
achieve interactive consistency between all nodes in the system,
it is required that these nodes also belong to the set . Because
the nodes in the set are a subset of the set , it is possible
that if there is a permanent failure of a node in the set , then
another node from the global set can replace the faulty node
in the set .
This research work has established that a two-stage imple-
mentation of the unified protocol, to achieve interactive consis-
tency between all of the nodes on a broadcast communication




The description of the protocol so far has used point-to-point
links between the nodes. However, it is intended that a shared
communication medium, or interconnect, be used. Fig. 4(a)
presents the first step toward implementing the algorithm
using a shared communication medium. In this figure, each
transmitting node had a single exclusive-access (or non-shared)
communication channel, i.e., only one specific node may
transmit messages on the communication channel. Unlike the
previous point-to-point links, each node had a point-to-multi-
point link or a broadcast communication channel, whereby the
receiving nodes may not influence the communication channel.
Using a shared communication channel, these exclusive ac-
cess channels are realized as virtual exclusive access communi-
cation channels. As a result, the physical interconnect for stage
2 is a single shared broadcast communication channel as illus-
trated in Fig. 4(b). If the communication system requirements to
establish the virtual exclusive broadcast communication chan-
nels are guaranteed, then the properties of the point-to-point
Fig. 5. Unified protocol using a single shared broadcast interconnect.
communication links are maintained. As a result, the operation
of the unified protocol is not altered. Thus, the proofs and formal
verification of the protocol as presented in [30] are valid for this
implementation.
It has been established that the source node, the set , is a
subset of the set . Therefore, using the virtual exclusive chan-
nels provided by the communication system, the initial source
node, i.e., the set , can also use the shared broadcast inter-
connect in stage 1 of the protocol. This is illustrated in Fig. 5. In
this example, the set consists of Node 1 and the set con-
sists of Nodes 2, 4, and 5, while the set consists of all nodes
in the communication system. Note that for each message that
is to be communicated, i.e., for each instance of the interactive
consistency algorithm, the members of the sets and may
change.
Again, because a shared broadcast communication channel
is used, all of the nodes can observe each message broadcast
on the communication channel. However, for each stage of the
protocol, only the destination nodes may use the messages trans-
mitted by the source nodes for that stage. For example, in Fig. 5,
Node 3 should discard any message received from Node 1. It
must use the messages transmitted from Nodes 2, 4, and 5 to
obtain the message sent by Node 1.
F. Interactive Consistency Algorithm
It has been established that for each message to be trans-
mitted, the set contains a single initial source node, and the
set contains all of the nodes in the communication system.
There must also be a number of nodes that act as destination
nodes for the first communication stage and source nodes for
second communication stage, i.e., nodes in the set . The
number of nodes in the set is governed by the number
of faults to be tolerated, specified according to a hybrid fault
model, and the maximum fault assumptions of the unified
protocol. The maximum fault assumptions, specified using a
hybrid fault model, are as follows.
1) Eligible good nodes Eligible asymmetric faulty
nodes Eligible symmetric faulty nodes for all nodes
in the set
2) Eligible good nodes Eligible asymmetric faulty
nodes Eligible symmetric faulty nodes for all nodes
in the set
3) Eligible asymmetric faulty nodes for all nodes in
the set or else Eligible asymmetric faulty nodes
for all nodes in the set
Nodes are judged to be eligible if they are not diagnosed as
faulty by a distributed diagnosis algorithm and if the message
transmitted by the node in the current communication stage ap-
pears to be non-faulty, i.e., it is not a benign faulty message.
The first fault assumption is required in order that a valid mes-
sage is received, i.e., the information in the message is correct
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and valid for the system. However, this work intends to achieve
interactive consistency in the presence of faulty nodes, including
faulty initial source nodes. In order to achieve interactive con-
sistency, agreement is required. Thus, the maximum fault as-
sumptions 2 and 3 as above are required. However, if fault as-
sumption 1 is violated, the algorithm cannot guarantee that the
consistent message received by all nodes is a valid message as
defined above.
As previously mentioned, the unified protocol uses the
flag to denote that a faulty message had been
received, and the flag is used to communicate that
a faulty message was received in the previous stage of commu-
nication. The unified protocol also facilitates the exclusion of
faulty nodes as diagnosed by a distributed diagnosis algorithm.
Each node maintains a record of the eligible (non-faulty) nodes
in the communication system. Only messages from eligible
nodes are used during any stage of communication. The set of
eligible nodes, excluding the nodes from which benign faulty
messages were received, for the current communication stage,
form the set of filtered eligible sources.
The interactive consistency algorithm operating on a time-
triggered broadcast communication system can now be listed as
follows.
1) The source node, the node in the set , transmits its mes-
sage on the communication system during its scheduled
time window.
2) All nodes on the communication system observe this mes-
sage. The nodes in the set store the message. If a be-
nign faulty message was received, the flag is
stored.
3) The nodes in the set transmit the message they re-
ceived on the communication system. If was
received, then the flag is transmitted. Each
node in the set transmits its message during different,
predefined time windows.
4) All nodes on the communication system, i.e., all nodes in
the set , observe and store these messages. If a benign
faulty message was received, then the flag
is stored. Each node then performs a majority vote on the
messages received in the previous step, i.e., messages from
nodes in the set , excluding messages from any non-
eligible nodes and any nodes from which a
was obtained. Thus, only messages received from filtered
eligible sources are used.
5) Each node concludes the result of this majority vote as the
message sent by the node in the set . If no majority
exists, the source node is recorded as being faulty, and the
flag is stored.
For each set , there exists a set . A minimum of three
nodes is required by the set in order to tolerate one non-be-
nign faulty node, as detailed by the maximum fault assumptions.
Any node in the communication system, excluding the node in
the set , can belong to the set . As a result, it is possible
that if a node in any set is globally diagnosed as faulty, then
it can be replaced by another node in the communication system.
G. Implementation of the Algorithm
The interactive consistency algorithm can be applied to any
communication system that can satisfy the requirements de-
tailed in Section IV-C and thus maintain the message properties
presented in Section IV-B. For this paper, a reliable time-trig-
gered communication system is required, providing a highly
reliable clock synchronization service, and ensuring that the
scheduled node has exclusive access to the specific communica-
tion channels. In addition, the communication system must pro-
vide a reliable communication medium, i.e., reliable commu-
nication channels. Such communication systems exist; specifi-
cally of interest for this paper are FlexRay and TTP/C, as already
mentioned.
Both FlexRay and TTP/C provide a Byzantine fault-tolerant
clock synchronization service and a reliable communication
medium. Each network protocol specifies two communication
channels and bus guardians to ensure the correct temporal
operation of the nodes. The interactive consistency algorithm
proposed in this research work may be applied to these net-
works, based on the services that they provide. Each message
that has to be transmitted, as defined by the algorithm, is
transmitted in a predefined time window. Depending on the
communication protocol, there are some specific requirements
that must be taken into consideration. For example, TTP/C
requires that each node is only allowed to be allocated a single
time slot in each communication cycle, which may appear to
prevent the implementation of the algorithm. However, each
message, as defined by the interactive consistency algorithm,
does not require a separate communication protocol message
frame. It may be possible to combine multiple independent data
messages within a single message frame. Such an approach may
allow the implementation of the algorithm without violating
the requirements of the underlying TTP/C protocol. Other
protocol mechanisms, such as the TTP/C clique avoidance
mechanism, also need to be taken into account; however, this
paper does not deal with the specific requirements of possible
underlying protocols. However, it is envisaged that specific
protocol requirements can be accommodated.
Another time-triggered control network being considered
in this research work is TTCAN. As previously mentioned,
TTCAN is not currently suitable for safety-critical applications
because it does not provide any redundant communication chan-
nels, nor does it specify any mechanism to ensure the temporal
isolation of faulty nodes. In addition, specific TTCAN-related
features, such as the CAN acknowledge bit, error frames, and
the fault tolerance of the time master (including Byzantine
fault tolerant clock synchronization), must be considered be-
fore TTCAN satisfies the necessary communication system
requirements to support the interactive consistency algorithm.
However, it is envisaged that a highly reliable TTCAN commu-
nication system can be realized. As an important step toward
such a system, the authors have developed a synchronization
layer to provide synchronized, redundant TTCAN communica-
tion channels [24].
V. DEMONSTRATION PROTOTYPE SYSTEM
A. Outline
In order to demonstrate the concept of applying the interac-
tive consistency algorithm to a time-triggered broadcast com-
munication system, using a shared communication medium, a
demonstration prototype system was realized. This prototype
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system is based on a dual channel TTCAN system, previously
developed by the authors.
The dual channel TTCAN communication system com-
prises two independent TTCAN communication channels,
each channel consisting of an independent communication
channel interface and protocol controller at each node. The
dual channel system incorporates a synchronization layer
to synchronize message communication on the independent
TTCAN communication channels. This synchronization layer
was experimentally demonstrated to synchronize message
transmission on two TTCAN network channels to within a
small tolerance. The synchronization layer and the dual channel
prototype system are described in detail in [24].
The dual channel TTCAN system is used to develop a pro-
totype system incorporating the interactive consistency algo-
rithm. As the purpose of the prototype system is to demon-
strate the concept of applying the interactive consistency al-
gorithm, specific TTCAN related issues, as previously men-
tioned, are not considered. It is assumed that the communica-
tion system provides a fault-tolerant, reliable interconnect. It is
also assumed that the communication system ensures that the
scheduled node has exclusive access to the shared communi-
cation channels during each time window. However, the proto-
type system does not implement bus guardians and other mech-
anisms to enforce these requirements. Instead, for the testing
of the prototype system, it is ensured that all nodes exhibit the
desired behavior. The prototype system represents a generic,
highly reliable, time-triggered control network, while taking ad-
vantage of TTCAN tools and expertise available within the au-
thors’ research group.
This prototype system demonstrates that agreement can be
achieved between all non-faulty nodes in the presence of a
Byzantine faulty source node, using the interactive consis-
tency algorithm. It is also demonstrated that agreement is not
achieved between all nodes in the presence of this Byzantine
faulty source node, if the interactive consistency algorithm is
not implemented. Also, the additional resources required to
implement the interactive consistency algorithm are discussed.
It is clear that additional network bandwidth is required for the
additional rounds of communication specified by the algorithm
and that additional processing of messages is also required.
However, once the network provides a minimum number of
nodes, additional nodes and additional communication chan-
nels are not required. For example, a minimum number of three
nodes are required in the set , to tolerate a single asymmetric
fault in that set.
B. Prototype System Overview
The prototype system consists of five dual channel TTCAN
nodes. The dual channel TTCAN nodes each consist of two sep-
arate TTCAN protocol controllers and transceivers, interfaced
to an Infineon SAB-C515C, 8-bit microcontroller. The TTCAN
protocol controllers are TTCAN test chips (TTCAN-TC) from
Bosch and are based on their TTCAN IP module [40]. The dual
channel TTCAN nodes are described in detail in [24]. Each node
is connected to both of the TTCAN network channels.
A TTCAN bus monitor is used on each communication
channel to monitor the message exchange on the communi-
Fig. 6. Prototype system illustration.
Fig. 7. Actual prototype system.
cation channel. The prototype system is illustrated in Fig. 6.
In order to insert communication channel faults, a CANstress
tool from Vector is used [41], [42]. This CANstress tool allows
various faults such a short circuit or an open circuit to be
inserted on a specific communication channel. A picture of the
actual prototype system is presented in Fig. 7.
C. Demonstration Application Function
In order to demonstrate the operation of the network, a very
simple application is implemented. In this application, there is
a single source node for data, Node 1. All other nodes on the
communication system (i.e., Nodes 2–5) receive the message
sent by Node 1, i.e., Message A.
In Message A, Node 1 communicates the value “GO” or the
value “STOP” to all other nodes. If Message A contains any data
that do not correspond to the value “GO” or the value “STOP,”
it is viewed as faulty by all other nodes, i.e., it is benign faulty.
All receiving nodes display a specific output on two LEDs, de-
pending on the data received. By observing the outputs at each
node, it easily can be concluded whether or not all nodes agree,
i.e., whether interactive consistency has been achieved.
D. System Operation Without the Interactive
Consistency Algorithm
It is desirable to test the prototype system both with and
without the interactive consistency algorithm being imple-
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Fig. 8. System schedule without the interactive consistency algorithm.
mented. Without the algorithm running, the system operation
is very simple. In its scheduled time window, the source node,
Node 1, transmits its message on both channels. Each node
receives the message on both communication channels and
performs a channel majority vote function. Each node then
displays the result of the majority vote.
The communication schedule for the prototype system, run-
ning without the interactive consistency algorithm, is illustrated
in Fig. 8. Note that the same communication schedule is used
for each communication channel. The communication schedule
is very simple, consisting of a single basic cycle and two exclu-
sive access time windows. In the first time window, the network
channel time master, in this case Node 2, transmits the TTCAN
reference message. In the next time window, Node 1 transmits
its message, Message A, containing the data specified by the ap-
plication.
E. System Operation With the Interactive
Consistency Algorithm
In order to apply the interactive consistency algorithm to this
prototype system, three sets of nodes must be defined, i.e., the
sets , and . For this prototype system, with Node 1 as




Recall that the algorithm operates as a two-stage instance of
the unified protocol. In the first communication stage, the nodes
in the set transmit their value to the nodes in the set .
Each node in the set performs a majority vote on the values
received in the first communication stage. The result of this ma-
jority vote is used in the second communication stage. In the
second communication stage, the nodes in the set transmit
the result of this majority vote to all nodes in the set . The
nodes in the set perform a majority vote of the values re-
ceived from the nodes in the set . They pass the result of this
majority vote to the application as the value transmitted by the
initial source node, i.e., the node in the set .
The communication schedule for the prototype system, run-
ning with the interactive consistency algorithm implemented, is
illustrated Fig. 9. Again the same schedule is used for both net-
work channels. In this case, there are five exclusive access time
windows. In the first time window, the network channel time
master, Node 2, sends the TTCAN reference message. In the
second time window, Node 1 transmits Message A, as detailed
by the application. In the subsequent three time windows, each
node in the set transmits the value that they received from
Node 1 in their respective time window.
Fig. 9. System schedule with the interactive consistency algorithm.
F. Faults Inserted
In order to demonstrate the operation of the interactive consis-
tency algorithm, asymmetric (or Byzantine) faults were inserted
into the prototype system. For an asymmetric fault, the faulty
node sends different data to different receivers, for a single mes-
sage transmission, on any channel. The node may exhibit asym-
metric behavior on a subset of communication channels or on
all of the communication channels, and it may send different
information on different channels. This faulty behavior is in-
serted into the prototype system by programming the source
node to transmit a specific message on each channel, during
its scheduled time window. Any specific receiving node is then
programmed to conclude a benign faulty message instead of
the message that was actually received on the communication
channel. In this way, some nodes conclude the actual message,
while other nodes conclude that a benign faulty message was
received.
G. Results
A number of test cases were run to demonstrate the operation
of the system, both with and without the implementation of the
interactive consistency algorithm. First, tests were carried out
to demonstrate the operation of the system with an asymmetric
faulty source node, i.e., Node 1. Without the implementation
of the interactive consistency algorithm, it was demonstrated
that interactive consistency is not achieved in the presence of
an asymmetric faulty source node. With the implementation of
the interactive consistency algorithm, it was demonstrated that
interactive consistency is achieved in the presence of an asym-
metric faulty source node.
In addition, a number of tests were carried out to demonstrate
the maximum fault assumptions of the interactive consistency
algorithm, as presented in Section IV-F. For these tests, the pro-
totype system with the algorithm running is used, and faults are
inserted into nodes in the set . The results demonstrated that
the interactive consistency algorithm can tolerate a number of
faults corresponding to the maximum fault assumptions. In this
prototype system, there are three nodes in the set . The max-
imum fault assumption states that, for this prototype, the algo-
rithm can tolerate one of the following fault combinations in the
set :
• one asymmetric faulty node or else;
• one symmetric faulty node or else;
• two benign faulty nodes.
H. Additional Resource Requirements for the Interactive
Consistency Algorithm
In order to implement the interactive consistency algorithm, a
number of additional resources are required, compared to a cor-
responding system that is not running the algorithm. Because a
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TABLE I
PROTOTYPE SYSTEM RESOURCE UTILIZATION
single source node is used for the first round of communication,
the main additional resources are required by the second round
of communication. The resources required for the first round
of communication correspond to the resources required for the
communication system running without the interactive consis-
tency algorithm. The main additional resource requirements are
as follows.
1) Additional communication system bandwidth is required
for the second round of communication. This resource is
dependent on the number of nodes in the set . In this
case, there are three nodes; therefore, three additional mes-
sages must be transmitted on the communication system,
for each message to be communicated. Thus, an additional
three times the bandwidth is required to support the inter-
active consistency service.
2) Additional processing time is required for the message
voting activity for the second round of communication.
Again, this is dependent on the number of nodes in the set
. In this case, there are three nodes, so each node must
vote between three values after the second round of com-
munication. In this implementation, the voting function re-
quires a maximum of 65 machine cycles, in each destina-
tion node, for the second round of communication (i.e., in
all nodes).
3) Additional message storage and message processing re-
sources, besides those required for the voting functions, are
required for the second round of communication. Again,
this is largely dependent on the number of nodes in the set
. Each node must store and process each message from
all nodes in this set. However, only nodes in this set must
store and process messages from the initial source node,
the node in the set . Therefore, there is also a resource
saving for one message, for all nodes that are exclusively
in the set , i.e., they are not also in the set or the set
.
The additional resource requirements for this prototype
system are presented in Table I. The resources required for a
system with one set (i.e., one initial source node), and for
a system with five sets (i.e., five initial source nodes), are
compared, both with and without the implementation of the
interactive consistency algorithm.
The main impact of this interactive consistency algorithm, as
highlighted, is on the communication system bandwidth usage.
In this prototype implementation, 75% of the total bandwidth
used is required to support the interactive consistency service.
This is the minimum overhead that is required by any message
exchange interactive consistency algorithm using basic oral
messages. This is defined by the node requirement
presented in Section III. This is the price that must be paid
in order to achieve interactive consistency in the presence of
Byzantine (or asymmetric) faulty nodes.
These results show the additional resource requirements for
the given interactive consistency algorithm, i.e., an algorithm
that specifies two communication stages and three source nodes
for the second communication stage. The additional resource
requirements apply to the TTCAN prototype system used, or
to a similarly configured FlexRay or TTP/C communication
system. The additional bandwidth requirement, along with the
message storage and voting requirements, are dependant on the
interactive consistency algorithm and thus are independent of
the underlying communication system protocol. However, it is
envisaged that greater efficiency may be achieved by transmit-
ting multiple data messages in a single communication protocol
message frame and by reuse of memory space for different mes-
sages.
However, it is important to note that no additional communi-
cation system nodes or communication channels are required to
implement the algorithm, once a minimum number of nodes are
present in the communication system.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has discussed the provision of an explicit inter-
active consistency algorithm on a time-triggered communica-
tion system, using a shared communication medium, such as
TTCAN, TTP/C, or FlexRay. Current state-of-the-art automo-
tive time-triggered communication systems do not support an
explicit interactive consistency service. To the authors’ knowl-
edge, no communication system using a shared communication
medium has implemented such an explicit interactive consis-
tency service.
The requirements of the interactive consistency algorithm, for
application to a communication system, have been established.
In addition, the properties that must be provided by the commu-
nication system to support the application of an interactive con-
sistency algorithm were defined. This research work has estab-
lished that the unified protocol is appropriate for application to
a communication system. A method of applying this algorithm
to a time-triggered broadcast communication system, using a
shared communication medium, has been defined. This involves
two main considerations as follows:
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1) ensuring that the communication system supports the im-
plementation of the algorithm;
2) re-engineering of the algorithm to apply it to such time-
triggered communication systems.
The underlying communication system protocol is not al-
tered; however, communication systems such as TTCAN must
include additional fault confinement mechanisms to ensure the
temporal isolation of faulty nodes. This is required in order to
provide the message properties required by the algorithm. The
operation of the algorithm, the unified protocol, is not altered;
thus, the proofs and the formal verification of the algorithm are
valid for this implementation. Through the temporal partitioning
of the communication system, virtual independent communica-
tion stages are provided, as required by the algorithm. Moreover,
the algorithm is applied to the communication system, without
the addition of independent, spatially redundant nodes.
A prototype demonstration system, based on a dual channel
TTCAN communication system, to demonstrate the operation
of the interactive consistency algorithm, has been realized by
the authors. This prototype system has been used to demonstrate
that interactive consistency is achieved in the presence of an
asymmetric faulty source node. It has also been demonstrated
that interactive consistency is not achieved without the imple-
mentation of the interactive consistency algorithm. In addition,
the prototype system has demonstrated that the interactive con-
sistency algorithm can tolerate a number of faults in accordance
with its maximum fault assumptions.
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